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| **Prevention of Accident Events** | |
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| **Event** | **Potential Prevention Measures** |
| **Three Mile Island** | >Reactor Operator Training and understanding of abnormal events >More intuitive and easy to see instrument panels would have helped operators to see situation better in real time >Technical Advisors present for all shifts during reactor interaction would have helped operators to understand transient situation >Emergency response measures in place would reduce panic |
| **Chernobyl** | >Improved operator training to let them know of the potential for flashing of coolant and danger of removing safety control rods >Safety systems should have had better failsafes in place to prevent situations for disaster because of operator choices >Design reactors to have a negative reactivity coefficient so that prompt criticality can be avoided all together >Set more rigorous safety culture standards so that safety comes before the wishes of the management |
| **Fukushima** | >Better location for Diesel generators, fuel tanks and electronics so that they are not as suceptable to being flooded with water. >More rigorous passive cooling and planning for station blackout conditions or beyond design basis events >Change the venting systems to be independent so that hydrogen explosions do not affect other portions of the plant |

NUCL 402 HW 11

Kevin Fischer – Professor Revankar

November 28th, 2011